nftables/chain.go

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// Copyright 2018 Google LLC. All Rights Reserved.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
package nftables
import (
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"encoding/binary"
"fmt"
"math"
"github.com/google/nftables/binaryutil"
"github.com/mdlayher/netlink"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
// ChainHook specifies at which step in packet processing the Chain should be
// executed. See also
// https://wiki.nftables.org/wiki-nftables/index.php/Configuring_chains#Base_chain_hooks
type ChainHook uint32
// Possible ChainHook values.
var (
ChainHookPrerouting *ChainHook = ChainHookRef(unix.NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING)
ChainHookInput *ChainHook = ChainHookRef(unix.NF_INET_LOCAL_IN)
ChainHookForward *ChainHook = ChainHookRef(unix.NF_INET_FORWARD)
ChainHookOutput *ChainHook = ChainHookRef(unix.NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT)
ChainHookPostrouting *ChainHook = ChainHookRef(unix.NF_INET_POST_ROUTING)
ChainHookIngress *ChainHook = ChainHookRef(unix.NF_NETDEV_INGRESS)
ChainHookEgress *ChainHook = ChainHookRef(unix.NF_NETDEV_EGRESS)
)
// ChainHookRef returns a pointer to a ChainHookRef value.
func ChainHookRef(h ChainHook) *ChainHook {
return &h
}
// ChainPriority orders the chain relative to Netfilter internal operations. See
// also
// https://wiki.nftables.org/wiki-nftables/index.php/Configuring_chains#Base_chain_priority
type ChainPriority int32
// Possible ChainPriority values.
var ( // from /usr/include/linux/netfilter_ipv4.h
ChainPriorityFirst *ChainPriority = ChainPriorityRef(math.MinInt32)
ChainPriorityConntrackDefrag *ChainPriority = ChainPriorityRef(-400)
ChainPriorityRaw *ChainPriority = ChainPriorityRef(-300)
ChainPrioritySELinuxFirst *ChainPriority = ChainPriorityRef(-225)
ChainPriorityConntrack *ChainPriority = ChainPriorityRef(-200)
ChainPriorityMangle *ChainPriority = ChainPriorityRef(-150)
ChainPriorityNATDest *ChainPriority = ChainPriorityRef(-100)
ChainPriorityFilter *ChainPriority = ChainPriorityRef(0)
ChainPrioritySecurity *ChainPriority = ChainPriorityRef(50)
ChainPriorityNATSource *ChainPriority = ChainPriorityRef(100)
ChainPrioritySELinuxLast *ChainPriority = ChainPriorityRef(225)
ChainPriorityConntrackHelper *ChainPriority = ChainPriorityRef(300)
ChainPriorityConntrackConfirm *ChainPriority = ChainPriorityRef(math.MaxInt32)
ChainPriorityLast *ChainPriority = ChainPriorityRef(math.MaxInt32)
)
// ChainPriorityRef returns a pointer to a ChainPriority value.
func ChainPriorityRef(p ChainPriority) *ChainPriority {
return &p
}
// ChainType defines what this chain will be used for. See also
// https://wiki.nftables.org/wiki-nftables/index.php/Configuring_chains#Base_chain_types
type ChainType string
// Possible ChainType values.
const (
ChainTypeFilter ChainType = "filter"
ChainTypeRoute ChainType = "route"
ChainTypeNAT ChainType = "nat"
)
// ChainPolicy defines what this chain default policy will be.
type ChainPolicy uint32
// Possible ChainPolicy values.
const (
ChainPolicyDrop ChainPolicy = iota
ChainPolicyAccept
)
// A Chain contains Rules. See also
// https://wiki.nftables.org/wiki-nftables/index.php/Configuring_chains
type Chain struct {
Name string
Table *Table
Hooknum *ChainHook
Priority *ChainPriority
Type ChainType
Policy *ChainPolicy
Device string
}
// AddChain adds the specified Chain. See also
// https://wiki.nftables.org/wiki-nftables/index.php/Configuring_chains#Adding_base_chains
func (cc *Conn) AddChain(c *Chain) *Chain {
cc.mu.Lock()
defer cc.mu.Unlock()
data := cc.marshalAttr([]netlink.Attribute{
{Type: unix.NFTA_CHAIN_TABLE, Data: []byte(c.Table.Name + "\x00")},
{Type: unix.NFTA_CHAIN_NAME, Data: []byte(c.Name + "\x00")},
})
if c.Hooknum != nil && c.Priority != nil {
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hookAttr := []netlink.Attribute{
{Type: unix.NFTA_HOOK_HOOKNUM, Data: binaryutil.BigEndian.PutUint32(uint32(*c.Hooknum))},
{Type: unix.NFTA_HOOK_PRIORITY, Data: binaryutil.BigEndian.PutUint32(uint32(*c.Priority))},
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}
if c.Device != "" {
hookAttr = append(hookAttr, netlink.Attribute{Type: unix.NFTA_HOOK_DEV, Data: []byte(c.Device + "\x00")})
}
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data = append(data, cc.marshalAttr([]netlink.Attribute{
{Type: unix.NLA_F_NESTED | unix.NFTA_CHAIN_HOOK, Data: cc.marshalAttr(hookAttr)},
})...)
}
if c.Policy != nil {
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data = append(data, cc.marshalAttr([]netlink.Attribute{
{Type: unix.NFTA_CHAIN_POLICY, Data: binaryutil.BigEndian.PutUint32(uint32(*c.Policy))},
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})...)
}
if c.Type != "" {
data = append(data, cc.marshalAttr([]netlink.Attribute{
{Type: unix.NFTA_CHAIN_TYPE, Data: []byte(c.Type + "\x00")},
})...)
}
Set rule handle during flush This change makes it possible to delete rules after inserting them, without needing to query the rules first. Rules can be deleted both before and after they are flushed. Additionally, this allows positioning a new rule next to an existing rule, both before and after the existing rule is flushed. There are two ways to refer to a rule: Either by ID or by handle. The ID is assigned by userspace, and is only valid within a transaction, so it can only be used before the flush. The handle is assigned by the kernel when the transaction is committed, and can thus only be used after the flush. We thus need to set an ID on each newly created rule, and retrieve the handle of the rule during the flush. There was an existing mechanism to allocate IDs for sets, but this was using a global counter without any synchronization to prevent data races. I replaced this by a new mechanism which uses a connection-scoped counter. I implemented a new mechanism for retrieving replies in Flush, and handling these replies by adding a callback to netlink messages. There was some existing code to handle "overrun", which I deleted, because it was nonsensical and just worked by accident. NLMSG_OVERRUN is in fact not a flag, but a complete message type, so the (re&netlink.Overrun) masking makes no sense. Even better, NLMSG_OVERRUN is never actually used by Linux. What this code was actually doing was skipping over the NFT_MSG_NEWRULE replies, and possibly a NFT_MSG_NEWGEN reply. I had to update all existing tests which compared generated netlink messages against a reference, by inserting the newly added ID attribute. We also need to generate replies for the NFT_MSG_NEWRULE messages with a handle added.
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cc.messages = append(cc.messages, netlinkMessage{
Header: netlink.Header{
Type: netlink.HeaderType((unix.NFNL_SUBSYS_NFTABLES << 8) | unix.NFT_MSG_NEWCHAIN),
Flags: netlink.Request | netlink.Acknowledge | netlink.Create,
},
Data: append(extraHeader(uint8(c.Table.Family), 0), data...),
})
return c
}
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// DelChain deletes the specified Chain. See also
// https://wiki.nftables.org/wiki-nftables/index.php/Configuring_chains#Deleting_chains
func (cc *Conn) DelChain(c *Chain) {
cc.mu.Lock()
defer cc.mu.Unlock()
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data := cc.marshalAttr([]netlink.Attribute{
{Type: unix.NFTA_CHAIN_TABLE, Data: []byte(c.Table.Name + "\x00")},
{Type: unix.NFTA_CHAIN_NAME, Data: []byte(c.Name + "\x00")},
})
Set rule handle during flush This change makes it possible to delete rules after inserting them, without needing to query the rules first. Rules can be deleted both before and after they are flushed. Additionally, this allows positioning a new rule next to an existing rule, both before and after the existing rule is flushed. There are two ways to refer to a rule: Either by ID or by handle. The ID is assigned by userspace, and is only valid within a transaction, so it can only be used before the flush. The handle is assigned by the kernel when the transaction is committed, and can thus only be used after the flush. We thus need to set an ID on each newly created rule, and retrieve the handle of the rule during the flush. There was an existing mechanism to allocate IDs for sets, but this was using a global counter without any synchronization to prevent data races. I replaced this by a new mechanism which uses a connection-scoped counter. I implemented a new mechanism for retrieving replies in Flush, and handling these replies by adding a callback to netlink messages. There was some existing code to handle "overrun", which I deleted, because it was nonsensical and just worked by accident. NLMSG_OVERRUN is in fact not a flag, but a complete message type, so the (re&netlink.Overrun) masking makes no sense. Even better, NLMSG_OVERRUN is never actually used by Linux. What this code was actually doing was skipping over the NFT_MSG_NEWRULE replies, and possibly a NFT_MSG_NEWGEN reply. I had to update all existing tests which compared generated netlink messages against a reference, by inserting the newly added ID attribute. We also need to generate replies for the NFT_MSG_NEWRULE messages with a handle added.
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cc.messages = append(cc.messages, netlinkMessage{
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Header: netlink.Header{
Type: netlink.HeaderType((unix.NFNL_SUBSYS_NFTABLES << 8) | unix.NFT_MSG_DELCHAIN),
Flags: netlink.Request | netlink.Acknowledge,
},
Data: append(extraHeader(uint8(c.Table.Family), 0), data...),
})
}
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// FlushChain removes all rules within the specified Chain. See also
// https://wiki.nftables.org/wiki-nftables/index.php/Configuring_chains#Flushing_chain
func (cc *Conn) FlushChain(c *Chain) {
cc.mu.Lock()
defer cc.mu.Unlock()
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data := cc.marshalAttr([]netlink.Attribute{
{Type: unix.NFTA_RULE_TABLE, Data: []byte(c.Table.Name + "\x00")},
{Type: unix.NFTA_RULE_CHAIN, Data: []byte(c.Name + "\x00")},
})
Set rule handle during flush This change makes it possible to delete rules after inserting them, without needing to query the rules first. Rules can be deleted both before and after they are flushed. Additionally, this allows positioning a new rule next to an existing rule, both before and after the existing rule is flushed. There are two ways to refer to a rule: Either by ID or by handle. The ID is assigned by userspace, and is only valid within a transaction, so it can only be used before the flush. The handle is assigned by the kernel when the transaction is committed, and can thus only be used after the flush. We thus need to set an ID on each newly created rule, and retrieve the handle of the rule during the flush. There was an existing mechanism to allocate IDs for sets, but this was using a global counter without any synchronization to prevent data races. I replaced this by a new mechanism which uses a connection-scoped counter. I implemented a new mechanism for retrieving replies in Flush, and handling these replies by adding a callback to netlink messages. There was some existing code to handle "overrun", which I deleted, because it was nonsensical and just worked by accident. NLMSG_OVERRUN is in fact not a flag, but a complete message type, so the (re&netlink.Overrun) masking makes no sense. Even better, NLMSG_OVERRUN is never actually used by Linux. What this code was actually doing was skipping over the NFT_MSG_NEWRULE replies, and possibly a NFT_MSG_NEWGEN reply. I had to update all existing tests which compared generated netlink messages against a reference, by inserting the newly added ID attribute. We also need to generate replies for the NFT_MSG_NEWRULE messages with a handle added.
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cc.messages = append(cc.messages, netlinkMessage{
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Header: netlink.Header{
Type: netlink.HeaderType((unix.NFNL_SUBSYS_NFTABLES << 8) | unix.NFT_MSG_DELRULE),
Flags: netlink.Request | netlink.Acknowledge,
},
Data: append(extraHeader(uint8(c.Table.Family), 0), data...),
})
}
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// ListChains returns currently configured chains in the kernel
func (cc *Conn) ListChains() ([]*Chain, error) {
return cc.ListChainsOfTableFamily(TableFamilyUnspecified)
}
// ListChain returns a single chain configured in the specified table
func (cc *Conn) ListChain(table *Table, chain string) (*Chain, error) {
conn, closer, err := cc.netlinkConn()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer func() { _ = closer() }()
attrs := []netlink.Attribute{
{Type: unix.NFTA_TABLE_NAME, Data: []byte(table.Name + "\x00")},
{Type: unix.NFTA_CHAIN_NAME, Data: []byte(chain + "\x00")},
}
msg := netlink.Message{
Header: netlink.Header{
Type: netlink.HeaderType((unix.NFNL_SUBSYS_NFTABLES << 8) | unix.NFT_MSG_GETCHAIN),
Flags: netlink.Request,
},
Data: append(extraHeader(uint8(table.Family), 0), cc.marshalAttr(attrs)...),
}
response, err := conn.Execute(msg)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("conn.Execute failed: %v", err)
}
if got, want := len(response), 1; got != want {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("expected %d response message for chain, got %d", want, got)
}
ch, err := chainFromMsg(response[0])
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return ch, nil
}
// ListChainsOfTableFamily returns currently configured chains for the specified
// family in the kernel. It lists all chains ins all tables if family is
// TableFamilyUnspecified.
func (cc *Conn) ListChainsOfTableFamily(family TableFamily) ([]*Chain, error) {
conn, closer, err := cc.netlinkConn()
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if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer func() { _ = closer() }()
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msg := netlink.Message{
Header: netlink.Header{
Type: netlink.HeaderType((unix.NFNL_SUBSYS_NFTABLES << 8) | unix.NFT_MSG_GETCHAIN),
Flags: netlink.Request | netlink.Dump,
},
Data: extraHeader(uint8(family), 0),
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}
response, err := conn.Execute(msg)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var chains []*Chain
for _, m := range response {
c, err := chainFromMsg(m)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
chains = append(chains, c)
}
return chains, nil
}
func chainFromMsg(msg netlink.Message) (*Chain, error) {
newChainHeaderType := netlink.HeaderType((unix.NFNL_SUBSYS_NFTABLES << 8) | unix.NFT_MSG_NEWCHAIN)
delChainHeaderType := netlink.HeaderType((unix.NFNL_SUBSYS_NFTABLES << 8) | unix.NFT_MSG_DELCHAIN)
if got, want1, want2 := msg.Header.Type, newChainHeaderType, delChainHeaderType; got != want1 && got != want2 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected header type: got %v, want %v or %v", got, want1, want2)
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}
var c Chain
ad, err := netlink.NewAttributeDecoder(msg.Data[4:])
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
for ad.Next() {
switch ad.Type() {
case unix.NFTA_CHAIN_NAME:
c.Name = ad.String()
case unix.NFTA_TABLE_NAME:
c.Table = &Table{Name: ad.String()}
// msg[0] carries TableFamily byte indicating whether it is IPv4, IPv6 or something else
c.Table.Family = TableFamily(msg.Data[0])
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case unix.NFTA_CHAIN_TYPE:
c.Type = ChainType(ad.String())
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case unix.NFTA_CHAIN_POLICY:
policy := ChainPolicy(binaryutil.BigEndian.Uint32(ad.Bytes()))
c.Policy = &policy
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case unix.NFTA_CHAIN_HOOK:
ad.Do(func(b []byte) error {
c.Hooknum, c.Priority, err = hookFromMsg(b)
return err
})
}
}
return &c, nil
}
func hookFromMsg(b []byte) (*ChainHook, *ChainPriority, error) {
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ad, err := netlink.NewAttributeDecoder(b)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
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}
ad.ByteOrder = binary.BigEndian
var hooknum ChainHook
var prio ChainPriority
for ad.Next() {
switch ad.Type() {
case unix.NFTA_HOOK_HOOKNUM:
hooknum = ChainHook(ad.Uint32())
case unix.NFTA_HOOK_PRIORITY:
prio = ChainPriority(ad.Uint32())
}
}
return &hooknum, &prio, nil
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}