176 lines
6.5 KiB
Go
176 lines
6.5 KiB
Go
package mru
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import (
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"encoding/binary"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"reflect"
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"testing"
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)
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func areEqualJSON(s1, s2 string) (bool, error) {
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//credit for the trick: turtlemonvh https://gist.github.com/turtlemonvh/e4f7404e28387fadb8ad275a99596f67
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var o1 interface{}
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var o2 interface{}
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err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(s1), &o1)
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if err != nil {
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return false, fmt.Errorf("Error mashalling string 1 :: %s", err.Error())
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}
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err = json.Unmarshal([]byte(s2), &o2)
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if err != nil {
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return false, fmt.Errorf("Error mashalling string 2 :: %s", err.Error())
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}
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return reflect.DeepEqual(o1, o2), nil
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}
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// TestEncodingDecodingUpdateRequests ensures that requests are serialized properly
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// while also checking cryptographically that only the owner of a resource can update it.
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func TestEncodingDecodingUpdateRequests(t *testing.T) {
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signer := newCharlieSigner() //Charlie, our good guy
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falseSigner := newBobSigner() //Bob will play the bad guy again
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// Create a resource to our good guy Charlie's name
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createRequest, err := NewCreateRequest(&ResourceMetadata{
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Name: "a good resource name",
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Frequency: 300,
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StartTime: Timestamp{Time: 1528900000},
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Owner: signer.Address()})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Error creating resource name: %s", err)
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}
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// We now encode the create message to simulate we send it over the wire
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messageRawData, err := createRequest.MarshalJSON()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Error encoding create resource request: %s", err)
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}
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// ... the message arrives and is decoded...
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var recoveredCreateRequest Request
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if err := recoveredCreateRequest.UnmarshalJSON(messageRawData); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Error decoding create resource request: %s", err)
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}
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// ... but verification should fail because it is not signed!
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if err := recoveredCreateRequest.Verify(); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("Expected Verify to fail since the message is not signed")
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}
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// We now assume that the resource was created and propagated. With rootAddr we can retrieve the resource metadata
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// and recover the information above. To sign an update, we need the rootAddr and the metaHash to construct
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// proof of ownership
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metaHash := createRequest.metaHash
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rootAddr := createRequest.rootAddr
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const expectedSignature = "0x1c2bab66dc4ed63783d62934e3a628e517888d6949aef0349f3bd677121db9aa09bbfb865904e6c50360e209e0fe6fe757f8a2474cf1b34169c99b95e3fd5a5101"
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const expectedJSON = `{"rootAddr":"0x6e744a730f7ea0881528576f0354b6268b98e35a6981ef703153ff1b8d32bbef","metaHash":"0x0c0d5c18b89da503af92302a1a64fab6acb60f78e288eb9c3d541655cd359b60","version":1,"period":7,"data":"0x5468697320686f75722773207570646174653a20537761726d2039392e3020686173206265656e2072656c656173656421","multiHash":false}`
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//Put together an unsigned update request that we will serialize to send it to the signer.
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data := []byte("This hour's update: Swarm 99.0 has been released!")
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request := &Request{
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SignedResourceUpdate: SignedResourceUpdate{
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resourceUpdate: resourceUpdate{
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updateHeader: updateHeader{
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UpdateLookup: UpdateLookup{
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period: 7,
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version: 1,
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rootAddr: rootAddr,
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},
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multihash: false,
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metaHash: metaHash,
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},
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data: data,
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},
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},
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}
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messageRawData, err = request.MarshalJSON()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Error encoding update request: %s", err)
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}
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equalJSON, err := areEqualJSON(string(messageRawData), expectedJSON)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Error decoding update request JSON: %s", err)
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}
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if !equalJSON {
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t.Fatalf("Received a different JSON message. Expected %s, got %s", expectedJSON, string(messageRawData))
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}
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// now the encoded message messageRawData is sent over the wire and arrives to the signer
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//Attempt to extract an UpdateRequest out of the encoded message
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var recoveredRequest Request
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if err := recoveredRequest.UnmarshalJSON(messageRawData); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Error decoding update request: %s", err)
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}
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//sign the request and see if it matches our predefined signature above.
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if err := recoveredRequest.Sign(signer); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Error signing request: %s", err)
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}
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compareByteSliceToExpectedHex(t, "signature", recoveredRequest.signature[:], expectedSignature)
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// mess with the signature and see what happens. To alter the signature, we briefly decode it as JSON
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// to alter the signature field.
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var j updateRequestJSON
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if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(expectedJSON), &j); err != nil {
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t.Fatal("Error unmarshalling test json, check expectedJSON constant")
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}
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j.Signature = "Certainly not a signature"
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corruptMessage, _ := json.Marshal(j) // encode the message with the bad signature
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var corruptRequest Request
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if err = corruptRequest.UnmarshalJSON(corruptMessage); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("Expected DecodeUpdateRequest to fail when trying to interpret a corrupt message with an invalid signature")
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}
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// Now imagine Evil Bob (why always Bob, poor Bob) attempts to update Charlie's resource,
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// signing a message with his private key
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if err := request.Sign(falseSigner); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Error signing: %s", err)
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}
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// Now Bob encodes the message to send it over the wire...
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messageRawData, err = request.MarshalJSON()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Error encoding message:%s", err)
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}
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// ... the message arrives to our Swarm node and it is decoded.
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recoveredRequest = Request{}
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if err := recoveredRequest.UnmarshalJSON(messageRawData); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Error decoding message:%s", err)
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}
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// Before discovering Bob's misdemeanor, let's see what would happen if we mess
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// with the signature big time to see if Verify catches it
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savedSignature := *recoveredRequest.signature // save the signature for later
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binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(recoveredRequest.signature[5:], 556845463424) // write some random data to break the signature
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if err = recoveredRequest.Verify(); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("Expected Verify to fail on corrupt signature")
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}
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// restore the Evil Bob's signature from corruption
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*recoveredRequest.signature = savedSignature
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// Now the signature is not corrupt, however Verify should now fail because Bob doesn't own the resource
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if err = recoveredRequest.Verify(); err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("Expected Verify to fail because this resource belongs to Charlie, not Bob the attacker:%s", err)
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}
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// Sign with our friend Charlie's private key
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if err := recoveredRequest.Sign(signer); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Error signing with the correct private key: %s", err)
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}
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// And now, Verify should work since this resource belongs to Charlie
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if err = recoveredRequest.Verify(); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Error verifying that Charlie, the good guy, can sign his resource:%s", err)
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}
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}
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