The precompile at 0x09 wraps the BLAKE2b F compression function:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7693#section-3.2
The precompile requires 6 inputs tightly encoded, taking exactly 213
bytes, as explained below.
- `rounds` - the number of rounds - 32-bit unsigned big-endian word
- `h` - the state vector - 8 unsigned 64-bit little-endian words
- `m` - the message block vector - 16 unsigned 64-bit little-endian words
- `t_0, t_1` - offset counters - 2 unsigned 64-bit little-endian words
- `f` - the final block indicator flag - 8-bit word
[4 bytes for rounds][64 bytes for h][128 bytes for m][8 bytes for t_0]
[8 bytes for t_1][1 byte for f]
The boolean `f` parameter is considered as `true` if set to `1`.
The boolean `f` parameter is considered as `false` if set to `0`.
All other values yield an invalid encoding of `f` error.
The precompile should compute the F function as specified in the RFC
(https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7693#section-3.2) and return the updated
state vector `h` with unchanged encoding (little-endian).
See EIP-152 for details.
* eth: chain config (genesis + fork) ENR entry
* core/forkid, eth: protocol independent fork ID, update to CRC32 spec
* core/forkid, eth: make forkid a struct, next uint64, enr struct, RLP
* core/forkid: change forkhash rlp encoding from int to [4]byte
* eth: fixup eth entry a bit and update it every block
* eth: fix lint
* eth: fix crash in ethclient tests
This PR adds some hardening in the lower levels of the protocol stack, to bail early on invalid data. Primarily, attacks that this PR protects against are on the "annoyance"-level, which would otherwise write a couple of megabytes of data into the log output, which is a bit resource intensive.
* core/state, cmd/geth: streaming json output dump cmd + optional code+storage
* dump: add option to continue even if preimages are missing
* core, evm: lint nits
* cmd: use local flags for dump, omit empty code/storage
* core/state: fix state dump test
* core, eth: some fixes for freezer
* vendor, core/rawdb, cmd/geth: add db inspector
* core, cmd/utils: check ancient store path forceily
* cmd/geth, common, core/rawdb: a few fixes
* cmd/geth: support windows file rename and fix rename error
* core: support ancient plugin
* core, cmd: streaming file copy
* cmd, consensus, core, tests: keep genesis in leveldb
* core: write txlookup during ancient init
* core: bump database version
* all: freezer style syncing
core, eth, les, light: clean up freezer relative APIs
core, eth, les, trie, ethdb, light: clean a bit
core, eth, les, light: add unit tests
core, light: rewrite setHead function
core, eth: fix downloader unit tests
core: add receipt chain insertion test
core: use constant instead of hardcoding table name
core: fix rollback
core: fix setHead
core/rawdb: remove canonical block first and then iterate side chain
core/rawdb, ethdb: add hasAncient interface
eth/downloader: calculate ancient limit via cht first
core, eth, ethdb: lots of fixes
* eth/downloader: print ancient disable log only for fast sync
* core, eth, trie: bloom filter for trie node dedup during fast sync
* eth/downloader, trie: address review comments
* core, ethdb, trie: restart fast-sync bloom construction now and again
* eth/downloader: initialize fast sync bloom on startup
* eth: reenable eth/62 until we properly remove it
This change makes getBalance, getCode, getStorageAt, getProof,
call, getTransactionCount return an error if the block number in
the request doesn't exist. getHeaderByNumber still returns null
for missing headers.
* cmd, eth, miner: disable advance sealing if user require
* cmd, console, miner, les, eth: wrap the miner config
* eth: remove todo
* cmd, miner: revert noadvance flag
The reason for this is: if the transaction execution is even longer
than block time, then this kind of transactions is DoS attack.
Ryan Schneider
Nguyen Kien Trung
Martin Holst Swende
Péter Szilágyi
Piotr Dyraga
gary rong
Christian Muehlhaeuser
Kitten King
大彬
jwasinger
cdetrio
Felföldi Zsolt
Matthew Halpern
Jonas