I forgot to change the check in udp.go when I changed Table.bond to be
based on lastPong instead of node presence in db. Rename lastPong to
bondTime and add hasBond so it's clearer what this DB key is used for
now.
* p2p: add DialRatio for configuration of inbound vs. dialed connections
* p2p: add connection flags to PeerInfo
* p2p/netutil: add SameNet, DistinctNetSet
* p2p/discover: improve revalidation and seeding
This changes node revalidation to be periodic instead of on-demand. This
should prevent issues where dead nodes get stuck in closer buckets
because no other node will ever come along to replace them.
Every 5 seconds (on average), the last node in a random bucket is
checked and moved to the front of the bucket if it is still responding.
If revalidation fails, the last node is replaced by an entry of the
'replacement list' containing recently-seen nodes.
Most close buckets are removed because it's very unlikely we'll ever
encounter a node that would fall into any of those buckets.
Table seeding is also improved: we now require a few minutes of table
membership before considering a node as a potential seed node. This
should make it less likely to store short-lived nodes as potential
seeds.
* p2p/discover: fix nits in UDP transport
We would skip sending neighbors replies if there were fewer than
maxNeighbors results and CheckRelayIP returned an error for the last
one. While here, also resolve a TODO about pong reply tokens.
This commit affects p2p/discv5 "topic discovery" by running it on
the same UDP port where the old discovery works. This is realized
by giving an "unhandled" packet channel to the old v4 discovery
packet handler where all invalid packets are sent. These packets
are then processed by v5. v5 packets are always invalid when
interpreted by v4 and vice versa. This is ensured by adding one
to the first byte of the packet hash in v5 packets.
DiscoveryV5Bootnodes is also changed to point to new bootnodes
that are implementing the changed packet format with modified
hash. Existing and new v5 bootnodes are both running on different
ports ATM.
The p2p packages can now be configured to restrict all communication to
a certain subset of IP networks. This feature is meant to be used for
private networks.
The discovery DHT contains a number of hosts with LAN and loopback IPs.
These get relayed because some implementations do not perform any checks
on the IP.
go-ethereum already prevented relay in most cases because it verifies
that the host actually exists before adding it to the local table. But
this verification causes other issues. We have received several reports
where people's VPSs got shut down by hosting providers because sending
packets to random LAN hosts is indistinguishable from a slow port scan.
The new check prevents sending random packets to LAN by discarding LAN
IPs sent by Internet hosts (and loopback IPs from LAN and Internet
hosts). The new check also blacklists almost all currently registered
special-purpose networks assigned by IANA to avoid inciting random
responses from services in the LAN.
As another precaution against abuse of the DHT, ports below 1024 are now
considered invalid.
On Windows, UDPConn.ReadFrom returns an error for packets larger
than the receive buffer. The error is not marked temporary, causing
our loop to exit when the first oversized packet arrived. The fix
is to treat this particular error as temporary.
Fixes: #1579, #2087
Updates: #2082
nodeDB.querySeeds was not safe for concurrent use but could be called
concurrenty on multiple goroutines in the following case:
- the table was empty
- a timed refresh started
- a lookup was started and initiated refresh
These conditions are unlikely to coincide during normal use, but are
much more likely to occur all at once when the user's machine just woke
from sleep. The root cause of the issue is that querySeeds reused the
same leveldb iterator until it was exhausted.
This commit moves the refresh scheduling logic into its own goroutine
(so only one refresh is ever active) and changes querySeeds to not use
a persistent iterator. The seed node selection is now more random and
ignores nodes that have not been contacted in the last 5 days.
If the timeout fired (even just nanoseconds) before the deadline of the
next pending reply, the timer was not rescheduled. The timer would've
been rescheduled anyway once the next packet was sent, but there were
cases where no next packet could ever be sent due to the locking issue
fixed in the previous commit.
As timing-related bugs go, this issue had been present for a long time
and I could never reproduce it. The test added in this commit did
reproduce the issue on about one out of 15 runs.
We don't have a UDP which specifies any messages that will be 4KB. Aside from being implemented for months and a necessity for encryption and piggy-backing packets, 1280bytes is ideal, and, means this TODO can be completed!
Why 1280 bytes?
* It's less than the default MTU for most WAN/LAN networks. That means fewer fragmented datagrams (esp on well-connected networks).
* Fragmented datagrams and dropped packets suck and add latency while OS waits for a dropped fragment to never arrive (blocking readLoop())
* Most of our packets are < 1280 bytes.
* 1280 bytes is minimum datagram size and MTU for IPv6 -- on IPv6, a datagram < 1280bytes will *never* be fragmented.
UDP datagrams are dropped. A lot! And fragmented datagrams are worse. If a datagram has a 30% chance of being dropped, then a fragmented datagram has a 60% chance of being dropped. More importantly, we have signed packets and can't do anything with a packet unless we receive the entire datagram because the signature can't be verified. The same is true when we have encrypted packets.
So the solution here to picking an ideal buffer size for receiving datagrams is a number under 1400bytes. And the lower-bound value for IPv6 of 1280 bytes make's it a non-decision. On IPv4 most ISPs and 3g/4g/let networks have an MTU just over 1400 -- and *never* over 1500. Never -- that means packets over 1500 (in reality: ~1450) bytes are fragmented. And probably dropped a lot.
Just to prove the point, here are pings sending non-fragmented packets over wifi/ISP, and a second set of pings via cell-phone tethering. It's important to note that, if *any* router between my system and the EC2 node has a lower MTU, the message would not go through:
On wifi w/normal ISP:
localhost:Debug $ ping -D -s 1450 52.6.250.242
PING 52.6.250.242 (52.6.250.242): 1450 data bytes
1458 bytes from 52.6.250.242: icmp_seq=0 ttl=42 time=104.831 ms
1458 bytes from 52.6.250.242: icmp_seq=1 ttl=42 time=119.004 ms
^C
--- 52.6.250.242 ping statistics ---
2 packets transmitted, 2 packets received, 0.0% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max/stddev = 104.831/111.918/119.004/7.087 ms
localhost:Debug $ ping -D -s 1480 52.6.250.242
PING 52.6.250.242 (52.6.250.242): 1480 data bytes
ping: sendto: Message too long
ping: sendto: Message too long
Request timeout for icmp_seq 0
ping: sendto: Message too long
Request timeout for icmp_seq 1
Tethering to O2:
localhost:Debug $ ping -D -s 1480 52.6.250.242
PING 52.6.250.242 (52.6.250.242): 1480 data bytes
ping: sendto: Message too long
ping: sendto: Message too long
Request timeout for icmp_seq 0
^C
--- 52.6.250.242 ping statistics ---
2 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100.0% packet loss
localhost:Debug $ ping -D -s 1450 52.6.250.242
PING 52.6.250.242 (52.6.250.242): 1450 data bytes
1458 bytes from 52.6.250.242: icmp_seq=0 ttl=42 time=107.844 ms
1458 bytes from 52.6.250.242: icmp_seq=1 ttl=42 time=105.127 ms
1458 bytes from 52.6.250.242: icmp_seq=2 ttl=42 time=120.483 ms
1458 bytes from 52.6.250.242: icmp_seq=3 ttl=42 time=102.136 ms
The previous metric was pubkey1^pubkey2, as specified in the Kademlia
paper. We missed that EC public keys are not uniformly distributed.
Using the hash of the public keys addresses that. It also makes it
a bit harder to generate node IDs that are close to a particular node.
This commit changes the discovery protocol to use the new "v4" endpoint
format, which allows for separate UDP and TCP ports and makes it
possible to discover the UDP address after NAT.
This a fix for an attack vector where the discovery protocol could be
used to amplify traffic in a DDOS attack. A malicious actor would send a
findnode request with the IP address and UDP port of the target as the
source address. The recipient of the findnode packet would then send a
neighbors packet (which is 16x the size of findnode) to the victim.
Our solution is to require a 'bond' with the sender of findnode. If no
bond exists, the findnode packet is not processed. A bond between nodes
α and β is created when α replies to a ping from β.
This (initial) version of the bonding implementation might still be
vulnerable against replay attacks during the expiration time window.
We will add stricter source address validation later.
Range expressions capture the length of the slice once before the first
iteration. A range expression cannot be used here since the loop
modifies the slice variable (including length changes).
Felix Lange
Péter Szilágyi
Felix Lange
Felföldi Zsolt
Ali Hajimirza
Jeffrey Wilcke
Ricardo Catalinas Jiménez
Jeffrey Wilcke
subtly